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This paper is intended to provide an analytical understanding of how the state policy and 
legislation in Russia influences the media business. The importance of the research is determined 
by the actuality of the problem due to its influence on the societal well-being in Russia and the 
need to evaluate the prospects for the future development of the industry. 
 
The work is divided into three parts: (1) The analysis of the statutory law that regulates the main 
activities of the media outlet; (2) The analysis of the media landscape in Russia and determining 
the scope of the governmental interference; (3) The analysis of the main problems in the media 
industry in Russia that were identified. 
 
The paper notes and concludes that the legislative restrictions, which are commonly justified 
with the necessity of the social or national security, do not necessarily imply the distortion of the 
functioning of Russian media, although the restrictive trends in the recently accepted legislation 
are increasing the limitations and threats to the media activities. The governmental interference 
in the media business is represented in the selective application of laws, threats of criminal 
prosecution both on organizational and personal level, that is used to exert pressure over media 
outlets has led to the situation of the eventual financial control of the major media by the state, 
state-related companies or the personas with close ties to the administration.  
 
The overall conclusion is that the problems that threaten the development of the media industry 
are aggravated by the state intention to gain complete control over the information sphere. The 
market share controlled by the state combined with trends in legislation and realities of the law 
enforcement in Russia lead to overall decline of mass media as a business and consequently 














According to Habermas, the access to reliable information and the opportunity to discuss it form 
not only the public sphere, but also an effective democratic society
1
. Thus, in his idealistic 
concepts mass media plays a role of the regulator of public life and as a special platform for the 
formation of public opinion.  
However, as it will be evident from the following work, in Russian reality the character of power 
is more reminiscent of Foucauldian concept of Panopticon with an only one-sided transparency 
and the immanent presence of implied observation
2
. A centralized authority of Kremlin 
administration arranges the system of surveillance over the media in such way that it is difficult 
or even impossible to tell about both what is being under its supervision due to its extensive 
powers and what can bypass their control, thus, creating an environment that is resembling round 
arrangement of the prison cells around the warder’s booth.  
The Russian media landscape from the legal-political point represents a successive mixture of 
the Soviet governing approach and a disguise of the functioning democratic state employed to 
evade an open confrontation with the human rights protection agencies. However, this disguise 
in the recent years seems to fade away gradually, as the government’s actions become more 
rigid, and the official explanation of their intentions clearly mismatches the reality. The close 
examination of the media business, the laws that regulate it and the actual application of those 
laws reveal that the state claims regarding the freedom of press in Russia are far from reality. 
Indeed, during the past two decades a number of major independent media outlets were either 
closed or bought by pro-Kremlin structures or persons, or, at least, experienced pressure over 
their editorial policy
3
. The issues of censorship and state control over information sphere in 
Russia are a frequent subject of academic research
4
. Despite the constitutional proclamation of 
freedom of media and prohibition of censorship, the state assertion of power results in de facto 
censoring policies and control over media industry. The interference in the media business is 
displayed in various ways, such as the increasing restrictions and surveillance policies of the new 
legislative initiatives, an abuse of judicial and executive powers and direct financial control of 
the mainstream media sources. The importance of the following work is determined by the need 
of evaluation of the legislative policy and government’s actions from the business perspective.  
The purpose of the following work is to examine the effects that this kind of policy has on the 
media business. The issues of legality of the application of law in the media industry are deemed 
to be the precondition to the threats, that the market is facing at the moment. The work is 
structured in three parts. The first chapter is dedicated to the analysis and interpretation of the 
laws that regulate activities of media outlets. The study of the main aspects of the media 
legislation is presented in the chapter’s subparts, which include: the analysis of basic law for 
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media business, Mass Media Law of 1993, the restrictions on the materials produced by media 
outlets, the regulation of the Internet and the Information Security Doctrine of Russia. The 
second chapter provides the evidence of the state influence on the work of major media 
resources. The structure of the chapter is stipulated by the need to differentiate between different 
types of media. The chapter subparts are dedicated to (1) terrestrial audio-visual broadcasters, (2) 
regional television, (3) digital media and (4) printed media. The last chapter enumerates and 
discusses the problems of the Russian media industry, based on the findings presented in the two 
previous chapters. In the concluding part the author derives the key findings and suggests 
questions for further research. 
The research and analysis are focused on the mass media segment of the media industry (e.g. 
audio-visual broadcasters, digital media and press) and excludes from the study such participants 
of the system as advertising agencies and news agencies. The predominant part of the work is 
dedicated to the examination of the television and internet media, as these are the most 
significant segments of the market, both in popularity and the revenues. The legal analysis of the 
state regulations mainly considers the interpretation of the legislation in the context of current 
political and business environment. Due to constraints on the scope of the work, in-depth 
analysis of the case law is left outside the subject of examination. The reasons behind such a 
limitation are the amplitude of the judicial practice, the complexity of the Russian judicial 
registry system and limited accessibility of the sources. Moreover, it has to be mentioned, that in 
the context of the work, the terms “government”, “state”, “Kremlin administration” are used as 
interchangeable and all refer to the group of people that practically have the main power in the 
country and decide on the policy of Russia.  
The resulting research question to be answered is: how does the legislative policy and state 
intervention in media business affect media industry in Russia?   
 
Methodology 
To achieve the goals set out above, the methodology used is a combination of legal doctrinal 
research and empirical research. The analysis of scholarly writings is used for the purpose of the 
assessment of the statutory legislation and interpretation of the laws in the context of political, 
economic and business environment. The vast reliance on the empirical research in this work is 
stipulated by the intention to examine the realities of Russian media system, to see them ‘as from 
within’, and limit the influence of the intermediaries.  
 
PART 1. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF MEDIA REGULATION. 
 
The legal basis for the functioning of media outlets is provided in the Articles of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation. They ensure the freedom of speech, freedom to search, get, transmit, 





 The Constitution also provides for the right to use abilities and resources for 
entrepreneurial and economic activities and prohibits monopolization and unfair competition
6
. 
The general essential rules for activities of different types of media are governed by the Mass 
Media Law of 1991.   
In terms of the process of formation of legislation in the field of mass information, the major 
significance is held in the following laws: The Federal Law “On Information, Information 
Technologies and Information Protection” No. 149-ФЗ dated July 27, 2006 (the Law on 
Information), and the Federal Law “On the procedure for covering the activities of state bodies 
in state mass media”. The latter one determines the criterion of “statehood” of the mass media 
and establishes the procedure for regular press coverage of the activities of state bodies. Other 
important laws include Law on Advertising (1995), Law on Communications (2004), Law on 
Information, Anti-Piracy Law (2013). They set rules for media in particular fields.  
Apart from these special laws, certain aspects of media activities are regulated by (a) Part 4 of 
the Civil Code, which is nearly entirely devoted to the field of intellectual property (the most 
important provision here remains Art. 152 on “Protection of honour, dignity and business 
reputation”, which is often invoked disputes related to media activities); (b) certain articles of the 
Criminal Code, e.g. Art 146 on "Violation of copyright and related rights"; (c) the entire Penal 
Code, which regulates the protection of information security of a person and a citizen (Article 
137 "Violation of privacy", Article 138 "Violation of the secrecy of correspondence, telephone 
conversations, postal, telegraph or other messages" special technical means intended for secretly 
obtaining information "); and other special legal sources, such as Code of Administrative 
Offenses, Law "On State Secrets", Federal Law "On Advertising", Federal Law "On the 
mandatory copy of documents.".   
In recent years, a lot of legislative changes that extend the restrictions on the dissemination of the 
information and modify the regulation of the administrative procedures in the media market took 
place. In 2014 the foreign ownership of media outlets was restricted
7
 and the laws that restrict 
the dissemination information were introduced. This includes the law prohibiting the propaganda 
of ‘non-traditional sexual relations’, the amendments to Criminal and Civil Codes, that increase 
responsibility for insulting the feelings of believers, the amendment that outlaws the use of foul 
language in mass media. Among that, the freedom of media is restricted by the prohibition of 
publications that constitute ‘extremist materials’ and materials advocating a “cult of violence and 
cruelty.” Negligence in the distribution of such materials can serve as a basis for criminal 
prosecution. The supervision over the media outlets and their publications is implemented by the 
Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, 
commonly known as Roskomnadzor, which monitors the observance of the prohibitions. It was 
re-established in 2008 by Resolution number 419, "On Federal Service for Supervision in the 
Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications", which provides the 
organ with censoring powers over information technologies, telecommunications, electronic 
media and mass communications. Apart from organizing the work and licensing for tele- and 
radio- media resources, the agency is responsible for the surveillance over all the mass media for 
their publications being in compliance with the laws. The procedure for controlling the 
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dissemination of illegal information is described in Article 15 of the Law on Information. 
Roskomnadzor after issuing two warnings within a year has the right to revoke the registry or 
withdraw a license of a media outlet or block the domain of internet resource without a judicial 
decision. 
The following chapter provides a scrutinized analysis of the legal framework aimed at regulating 
media activities. For this goal, most relevant rules are grouped in terms of their effect on the 
functioning of media. The first part focuses on the general rules provided in the Mass Media 
Law; the second part concerns the legislation restricting the dissemination of information and the 
third one is dedicated to the most important rules relevant to the activities of the digital media 
and internet-based resources. The last part of the analysis also includes the overview of the 
Information Security Doctrine, as this text is deemed to bring light on the overall approach taken 
by the government for the development of media-related legislation.  
 
1.1 Mass Media Law of 1991  
The Media Law of 1991 outlines the main principles of the functioning of media undertakings. 
Having been introduced almost thirty years ago, it is a compilation of essential rules that regulate 
all activities of press and Media. The law represents the first effort to develop a modern legal 
framework for media policy in the newly established democratic society. The period of dramatic 
historical changes during which the law was drafted lead to it coming out as a “an awkward 
version of an ideal, a sometimes apolitical formulation of the proper relationship between the 
media and the state”8. In practical terms it appears more as an emblem of newly established 




The law requires the registration of a media outlet, and the authorities are limited to an 
exhaustive list of acceptable reasons to deny it. Thus, official discretion is limited in such 
matters. The law also provides the government with an ability to de-register a media outlet and 
close it in case of an “abuse of freedom of media” and the publications violate enumerated 
prohibitions
10
. Under the Mass Media Law, a media outlet that disregards these content 
restrictions may be shut down. However, this requires a court order, and an precondition that the 
media was previously notified with two warnings from an surveillant agency twice within a 
twelve-month period.  
The law also allows for the ownership of a mass media outlet by any ‘state organ’.  This reveals 
the mixed character of the Russian legislative approach which combines the inherent traits of the 
Soviet system with the attempt to establish a legal framework for the emergence of a proper 
democratic civil society. 
The law regulates relations between "founders," editorial collectives, and publishers. The term 
‘founder’ (‘учредитель’) itself is of crucial importance for the understanding of the role of the 
                                                 
8
 Monroe E. Price, “Law, Force, and the Russian Media”, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. (1995), 798  
9
 Ibid., 799  
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government may legally take in relation to managing a media source
11
. This legal concept that 
was developed in the Soviet Union and introduced initially in the 1990 USSR Press Law to 
replace the state or party control over their own press institutions. The term was transferred to 
the Russian Mass Media Law. Under Article 7 of this law individuals, associations of 
individuals, enterprises, organizations, institutions, or state bodies can be founders or co-
founders of a media outlet. Foreign citizens or stateless persons not residing in the Russian 
Federation may not serve as founders. Under Article 8 of the same law, the founder is 
responsible for submitting the application to register a media outlet. The Mass Media Law 
reinvented the term, creating essentially a new kind of sponsor, one that acted as an intermediary 
between the government and the media organization. However, although the provisions that 
safeguard the editorial freedom are present, the statute only concerns the relationship between 
journalists and founders. The law says practically nothing about media owners and the 
possibilities of financiers, both shareholders and informal sponsors, to interfere in an editorial 
policy of a media outlet.
12
  
In 2016 the amendments to provisions of the law which govern the foreign capital of media 
businesses were introduced
13
. The law outlaws the ownership of and control, direct or indirect 
(through holding aggregate more than 20 percent stake in the authorized capital) over Russian 
legal entities with a broadcasting license under Russian jurisdiction. These protectionist 
measures continue the trend of limiting foreign presence in the information sphere in Russian 
media, that were seen in the earlier laws on foreign agents
14
 and unwanted NGOs
15
. These laws, 
however, serve solely political interests of the government and are aimed at securing the 
sovereignty of the political life in Russia
16
.  
The Article 4 of the Mass Media law provides the authorities with a right to issue warnings to the 
editorial board when the ‘abuse of the freedom of mass media’ occurs. This term includes such 
outlawed activities as calls for extremist and terrorist activities, the use of obscene language, 
propaganda of cruelty or information about illegal drugs (all of this is to be described in detail 
the following part on restrictions of the dissemination of information). Despite the necessity of 
the provision for securing public order, the specific interpretation of these terms can lead to 
censorship well beyond what a literal reading of the law suggests.  
To sum it all up, the law has general character and there is not a lot of precision in the rules 
provided: “Clumsy formulations, lengthy recitations, and awkward adjustments of old ways to 
new political realities could not suffice to ensure the evolution of free press.”17 Combined with 
the duality of the character of the legislation, this opens a door for the different course of the 
development. Due to the impact of the fast-growing technological advancements in the 
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information sphere, a whole series of other laws regulating the activities of the media was 
predestined to be adopted since the Media Law was passed. 
 
1.2 Restrictions on the dissemination of information 
The extension of legislative restrictions of the dissemination of the information is represented in 
several laws recently accepted by Russian authorities. The areas of regulation include the usage 
of obscene language, the protection of minors, protecting the feelings of believers, fighting 
extremism and defamation and prohibiting materials advocating violence and cruelty. These laws 
are distorting the work of media outlets as their application in practice outlaws the potential 
topics, information and the means of its presentation for the media publications.  
The probably most significant and most popular in terms of the frequency of the evocation are 
the restrictions stemming from the extensive anti-terrorism legislative policy. The Federal Law 
“On Countering Extremist Activities” No. 114-FZ from July 25, 2002, is one of the most 
ambiguous and dangerous laws for the journalists. In accordance with this law, the Federal List 
of Extremist Organizations and the Federal List of Extremist Materials are formed and 
maintained by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. The activities that constitute 
criminal offence are listed in the Articles 280, 282 and 205(2) of the Criminal Code of Russian 
Federation. These concern public calls for extremist activity (including actions aimed at violating 
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation), incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as 
abasement of human dignity and public calls for terrorist activities, public justification of 
terrorism or propaganda of terrorism respectively. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
has explained that the distribution of extremist materials on a massive scale, can be either 
administrative or criminal offense, depending on the intent of the perpetrator. Criminal liability 
under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation occurs if extremist materials 
are massively distributed in order to incite hostility or hatred, and also to degrade the dignity of a 
group of people or one citizen
18
. According to Federal Law N 114-FZ, the term ‘extremist 
activity’ among all refers to excitation of racial, national or religious strife, public justification of 
terrorism, propaganda and public display of Nazi attributes or symbolism similar to Nazi 
attributes or symbolism to the point of confusion, or attributes or symbolism of extremist 
organisations. The latter clause is of particular interest, as the literal interpretation of it suggests 
that only public display of the symbols for the propagandist purposes would constitute extremist 
activity. However, the cases of practical application of the law, which are to be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter, show, that Russian judiciaries could interpret it in a different 
way. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance in its report for 2019, marks the 
presence of abuse of anti-extremism legislation in Russia. It concluded, that the federal list of 
extremist materials is extensive and the number of persecuted for extremist activity is extremely 
large and is growing every year. Site blocking procedures, including extrajudicial, can be used to 
                                                 
18
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censor and suppress dissent
19
. The Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights has 
disapproved the legislation as well. In the 2018 it issued recommendations, that contained 
statistics proving the current legislation inefficiency and provided the legislators with the 
improvement recommendations
20
. Later the same year the law providing for partial 
decriminalization of Article 282 of the Criminal Code was accepted. It changed the liability to 
administrative penalty, unless a similar offense was committed earlier within one-year period
21
. 
The law will surely decrease the number of the criminal trials, but it is unlikely to cancel out the 
possibilities for the misinterpretation of the reasons for the prosecution by the judiciaries. The 
legitimacy of the free expression of one’s opinion is the basis of democracy, but it is often 
mistaken by the prosecution for the public calls for illegal activities.  
Negligence in the distribution of materials, not necessarily even related to extremism, can serve 
as a basis for criminal prosecution as well. The implications of the law are very broad and open 
for interpretation. For instance, a publication about the corruption among the state authorities can 
be interpreted as an attempt to spark hatred against state officials, or the publication that contains 
extremist symbolic, even if it is necessary for the illustrative purposes can lead to a penalty
22
.  
The laws related to the protection of personal data also restrict the actions of the reporters. The 
inability to get permission from the institutions or persons to use certain information about them 
is sometimes necessary produce materials and naming them might also lead to prosecution. 
The Federal Law about the language of Russian Federation disallows using the ‘words and 
expressions which are not meeting standards of the modern Russian literary language’ in mass 
media
23
. In 2014 the provision was amended with inclusion of strong language in this rule. Thus, 
this law, in fact, prohibits any word usage that does not comply with the norms of the modern 
Russian literary language. However, the clear definition of what these norms are does not exist, 
nor does the official list of the prohibited words, so the experts determine them at any given time 
with the help of an “independent examination”. 
 
1.3 Internet regulations 
 
The Law on Information regulates the basic principles of the right to search, receive and 
disseminate information, therefore it is the main legal source of the rules applied to digital 
media. The Internet is generally accepted to be a communication environment where everyone 
can exercise their constitutional rights to seek freely, to receive, transmit, produce and 
disseminate information. Indeed, the restrictive trend of recent rulemaking did not bypass the 
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Internet aspect. The growth of state interest in Internet regulation that began in 2012 with an 
acceptance of the "Law on Black Lists of Runet"
24
. This law has introduced a number of 
provisions to other federal laws, which presuppose filtering of Internet sites with the blacklist 
system and blocking prohibited Internet resources. It contained amendments to the laws “on the 
protection of children from the information harmful for their health and development” (FZ-436), 
“on communications” (FZ-126) and “on information, information technologies and the 
protection of information” (FZ-149). The law initially targeted the website that contains the 
materials advocating suicide or drug production or abuse and disseminating child pornography. 
This was further amended to allow blocking ‘extremist’ materials (according to the Federal List 
of Extremist Materials comprising prohibited content). Beginning from 2012, Russia maintains a 
centralized internet blacklist (the "single register") managed by the Federal Service for 
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, or Roskomnadzor. 
The reasons for blocking include “extremism”, “suicide propaganda”, “arousing hostility”, 
“insult to representatives of the authorities”, “calls for separatism”, “insult of the feelings of the 
faithful”, “propaganda for non-traditional sexual relations” and many others.  
Currently one can clearly mark tendencies to increase censorship, providing special services with 
new powers to control the information space. The most resonant laws in the field of Internet 
regulation, apart from the above mentioned "Law on Black Lists of Runet" are  Federal Law of 
05/05/2014 N 97-FZ ("law on bloggers"), Federal Law of 12/28/2013 N 398-ФЗ ("Law on pre-
trial blocking of Internet resources"), Federal Law of 07/02/2013 N 187-FZ ("anti-piracy law"). 
These laws reveal the expansion of the grounds for bringing users and site owners to 
responsibility in the recent legislation. The “Law on bloggers” was one of the most illustrative 
examples of an attempts to tighten the control over activities of the people on the internet. This 
law was accepted as a part of “anti-terrorist package” in 2014. It imposed the same duties and 
rights as of traditional media on the ‘the owner of the site and (or) pages of the site on the 
Internet, on which publicly available information is placed and access to which during the day is 
more than three thousand users’25. The owners of popular websites, pages in social networks 
(bloggers) and other resources on the Internet were required to register with the Federal Service 
for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications 
(Roskomnadzor). A special registry was made for those purposes. The law proved inefficient and 
after three years it was annulled it by the Federal Law 276-FZ, which, at the same time, imposed 
a ban on the use of technologies to bypass government locks (the law on regulation of VPN, 
anonymizers and search engines).  
The anti-terrorist policy of the legislators is further manifested in the laws that govern data 
protection regime. Recent legislative amendments that extend the state’s abilities of data 
retention: Federal Laws 374-FZ and 375-FZ, commonly known as Yarovaya laws, obliged the 
telecommunications and Internet companies to maintain the copies of all contents of 
communications for six months and disclose that, as well as the metadata and “all the 
information necessary for decoding” to the authorities on the request and without court order. 
These laws have provoked a lot of criticism and public discontent in relation to the 
incompatibility with the human rights and privacy, and the constitutionality of such an 
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interference in the personal life of the citizens was questioned
26
. Providing nearly full access to 
the data of the users of social media, messenger services and traditional telecommunication was 
officially claimed to be intended to help regulating illegal activities, mainly fighting extremism 
or preventing terrorist attacks, require companies to hand over encryption keys.  
Nowadays the situation has escalated with a distinct case for discussion being the acceptance of 
the bill on "On an Autonomous Internet System"
27
. The law provides for a creation of a Russian 
Internet resource that would allow it to operable in case if the connection of Russian telecom 
operators to foreign Internet servers is impossible. The legislators have explicitly justified the 
initiative with the aggressive nature of the US National Cyber Security Strategy adopted in 
September 2018
28
. A national domain name system will be created and special traffic routing 
rules will be developed, which is supposed to prevent the potential withdrawal of .ru and .рф 
domains and Russian own routing system is to protect blocks of IP addresses from the 
withdrawal from Internet providers. The protectionist nature of the law does not seem to justify 
fully such a costly project. Apart from the officially stated reasons, the purposes of the law may 
include the aim of gaining complete control over internet space, another opportunity for budget 
embezzlement, a backup for oppressing possible mass protests and social unrest and even actual 
preparation for Russia being disconnected from the global web as a result of political conflict. 
From the business perspective, it is likely to threaten the position of foreign business giants and 
their leave of the market, as it would be easier to leave rather than to overcome the legal barriers 
and the size of the Russian market is not enough the fight.  
 
1.4 Information security doctrine 
 
At the end of 2016, Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving of the new Doctrine of information 
security of the Russian Federation. The doctrine which replaced the similar document from 2000 
is a strategic planning document in the field of national security, which sets out the threats 
perceived by the government and sheds light on the government’s approach to the development 
of information services. Among the main information threats to the national security the 
Doctrine lists the desire of "individual states" to use technological superiority to dominate the 
information space, the increase by foreign countries of the possibilities for rendering an 
“informational and psychological impact” on the Russian population with a view to internal 
political destabilization and undermining the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, an increase 
in the number of materials in the foreign media containing “a biased assessment of the state 
policy of the Russian Federation”, and discrimination against the Russian media abroad. 
Compared to the preceding doctrine, the new document places greater emphasis on the danger of 
“informational and psychological impact” on the individual and public consciousness of Russian 
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citizens by foreign special services, as well as terrorist and extremist organizations. Apart from 
that, in the doctrine of 2016, for the first time, a tendency of increasing negative assessments of 
Russia in foreign media is mentioned. In the previous edition of the document it was said only 
about the "danger of dependence of the spiritual, economic and political spheres of the public life 
of Russia on foreign information structures." 
These formulations indicate how the government articulates the external threat to legitimize the 
enclosure of the community from the outside world.
29
 The view that foreign governments use the 
power of  the information to undermine political and social stability and the emphasis on the 
‘defence of the sovereignty’ in this case can be interpreted as a clear intention of the government 
to further extend the restrictions concerning both the dissemination of the information and the 
role played by the foreign agencies in the media sphere. This is clearly illustrated by all recent 
legislation, from the foreign media ownership amendment to the bill on the Autonomous Runet. 
The textual representation of the values and threats proposed in the Doctrine seems to 




PART 2. GOVERNMENTAL PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF 
DIFFERENT MEDIA SOURCES. 
 
Since the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin, the Russian media landscape was marked with 
evolving surveillance over media and information spreading services. Is it the secret services 
background of the president or the overall heritage of the Soviet Epoch, but the attitude of the 
ruling elite seems to understand the power of information and, furthermore, is eager to exploit it 
in a way to secure themselves from the threats arising from the free media. Indeed, in other 
countries with developed democratic societies, the authorities are often known to interact with 
the media and exert certain influence. This seems inevitable, but the effect of such interactions 
do not cause problems to the development of the media businesses: the balance of competing for 
political powers lead to the media being interested in creating quality content and developing 
technologies rather than preserving the coherent, one-sided politically desired perspective of 
presenting the information. In the case of Russia, the flipside of the governmental intervention in 
the activities of media businesses is the barriers that establish for the development with a lack of 
healthy competition. This issue can be approached from two ways: one is how the existing 
censorship policy threats the evolvement of the new media resources that create the content 
deemed undesirable by the government thus creating a barrier to enter the market and the second 
one relates to the gradual takeover of the existing and emerging, potentially successful media 
resources by the pro-governmental media tycoons, that have close ties to Kremlin. In this chapter 
the author considers the existing environment for the functioning of different types of media 
resources and the ways that the government applies or may apply to exert pressure on those. The 
division is driven between the federal and regional audio-visual broadcasting, digital media and 
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press segments of the media market. Although many of the media outlets from these different 
groups belong to same media holdings (as it will be mentioned in more detail in this chapter) 
thus being, in fact, subject to the control of the same people, the scale and means of the 
governmental intervention vary within these groups.  
The author seeks to explore the nature of governmental influence on the development of the 
media sector. Although the legislation is often used by the authorities to exert pressure on the 
media, the Russian government does not resort to open censorship and violence. The 
constitutional prohibition of censorship and propaganda makes it impossible to resort to such 
measures to exert pressure over the editorial board. The government resorts to detour direct 
influence and uses a “softer” and more ambiguous approach of employing administrative 
measures to ensure a pro-Kremlin position. Such measures may include withdrawing licenses or 
imposing fines that impoverish the company, drive it to bankruptcy. This all is possible due to 
both the legislative aspect of the vague formulations of the laws and the executive aspect and 
common practice of selective law enforcement.  
According to Albert Hirschman’s ‘Exit/Voice/Loyalty’ theory, the journalists are forced to 
choose between either speaking freely, staying loyal to the government in their publications or 
exiting the job. The rise of the ‘costs’ of the ‘voice’ leads to many participants in the industry 
inclining towards exit or loyalty
31
. The journalists that hold critical views and are capable of 
expressing discontent or criticizing the political power are forced to either quit or keep silent. 
The effect of de facto existing censorship is achieved mainly through the management’s hiring 
and firing practices and the uncertainty regarding the rules of the game. That is why the Russian 
censorship system now is characterised with “softer” and more sophisticated tools rather than 
deploying excessive violence and open coercion: ‘it seems that stability and compliance can be 
ensured through deliberately creating an ambiguity about the rules of the game, so that nobody 
really knows how to act, what is allowed, and what is not allowed’.32 In the following chapter 
discusses the particular cases of this selective ‘punishment’, that is seen by the others as an 
example warning of the potential consequences of standing in the way for Kremlin. Apart from 
that, the administrative structure of the main media holdings will be discussed in order to draw 
the linkages between the runners of most of the media outlets and the government.  
  
2.1 Federal audio-visual broadcast 
 
Currently, television remains the dominant media in Russia. Terrestrial on-air television in 
Russia is generally available: at least one TV-channel is received by 99 per cent of the 
population and average TV viewing time in Russia is about 5 hours and 53 minutes, which is 
relatively high
33
. Television remains the main source of information for 71 percent of Russians, 
according to FOM statistics, and 36 per cent name it as the most reliable source of information
34
. 
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These rates were decreasing over the last years, yet TV still remains the most popular and 
influential media in Russia, although the younger population view the Internet almost of an 
equivalent level of access and influence. The statistics also show that the predominance of the 
TV outside big cities is higher
35
.  
Few federal broadcasters are dominating the media landscape. They operate ten on-air channels 
that are transmitted from Moscow and are almost universally available. At the moment, the 
several companies that run the ten main channels are All-Russia State Television and Radio 
Broadcasting Company (‘Vserossijskaya Gosudarstvennaya Televizionnaya i Radioveshatelnaya 
Kompaniya’ or VGTRK), National Media Group (NMG) and Gazprom-Media Holding (GMH). 
The lack of transparency in the ownership structures of the companies makes it impossible to 
point out the direct linkages between the shareholders and the administration. The absence of the 
publicly available data
36
 on the shareholders combined with sometimes complex schemes of 
offshoring allows the state official to deny the existence of the censorship and speak about the 
importance of the freedom of mass media and the unacceptability of the governmental 
intervention in its work
37
. Nonetheless, even from the existent information, it is evident that 
either direct governorship of the editorial policy through state ownership or indirect influence 
due to the stakes owned by the persons or entities close to Kremlin or Putin himself can be 
achieved. 
VGTRK media group is a state-owned media holding that is the biggest in Russia. In 2016 it was 
reported to have the controlling stake of two of Russia’s top TV channels, Channel 1 and 
Rossiya 1. Apart from that, the group owns and operates other three national TV channels, two 
international channels, five radio stations, over 80 regional TV channels and radio stations and 
an information agency.  
Among the assets of the NMG holding are 25% of the shares (blocking stake) in Channel One, as 
well as controlling stakes in Channel Five and REN TV.  It is controlled by Bank Rossiya, the 
main shareholder of which is Yuri Kovalchuk, known for his proximity to President Vladimir 
Putin. Kovalchuk’s association with the current president dates back to the early 1990s, when 
both of them were beginning their careers in St Petersburg - one as a member of city 
administration and another as a businessman.
38
 Other major NMG stockholders include the 
energy company Curgutneftegaz and another industry giant, Severstal (both companies believed 
to have close ties with Kremlin)
39
. A small stake is owned by the company "RTL group", 
registered in Luxembourg. The precise structure of NMG’s ownership structure are obscure and 
have become even more so after the imposition of sanctions on Bank Rossiya and Kovalchuk.  
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Gazprom Media Holding is a subsidiary of Gazprom for media asset management. The holding 
can also be called to some extent the property of the state since 100% of its shares belong to the 
Russian national company Gazprom. The ultimate owners of Gazprom Media are unknown. In 
2001-2002, the holding received its main assets from Media-Bridge, Vladimir Gusinsky, in the 
course of his "dispute between business entities" and Gazprom. Gazprom-Media now owns two 
national TV channels (NTV and entertainment channel TNT), as well as the satellite channel 
NTV-PLUS. It also owns five radio stations, including Ekho Moskvy, a publishing house and 
other assets.  
The actual control of the state over the policy of main TV broadcaster is thus rooted in the 
ownership of the main players in the market, either direct or involving dependency ties. It is 
possible both due to the absence of the solid legal foundation for the functioning of the 
independent media business and the abuse of powers by the administration. In the eyes of the 
current government, television is seen as a primary and most efficient tool to influence people. 
With Putin’s coming to power in 2000, the control over audio-visual media began to tighten. 
Among numerous cases of governmental intervention and exerting pressure over media outlet, an 
early case of NTV takeover was the one to receive the most coverage. It reflects the methods 
employed by the government to exert pressure over media in Russia. The events that took place 
around this independent channel in 1999-2003 signified both the government’s attitude towards 
unwanted content on air and the ways that are to be used to get rid of it. After the somewhat 
troublesome entrance in 1993, the channel has been benefiting from the existent at that time 
political favouritism.
40
 The channel received state support during the 1990s, displayed in lower 
licencing fees, tax reduction, and exemptions from customs duties on imported equipment 
together with a financial aid, when partly state-owned Gazprom bought out 30 per cent stake, 
resulting in a significant cash inflow to the business. Despite that, the network produced 
controversial from the government’s perspective materials, such as negative coverage of 
Russia’s actions in the First Chechen war. After the conflict related to the privatization of the 
Svyazinvest company, in which the Media-Most owners’ interests were affected, the publications 
in the holding’s media outlets with attacks on the government started to increase even further. 
The network lost governments support but managed to survive the crisis of 1998 and remain one 
of the most popular channels due to the high-quality content that it produced. However, after 
Putin coming to power in 1999, the pressure on the channel and its owner, Vladimir Gusinsky, 
started to increase. It combined raids of the tax police, backed by FSB and general prosecutors 
office, criminal investigation and arrests, accompanied by the financial squeeze. Although the 
legislation does not allow for the replacement of the employers in the media outlets by the state 
officials, the financial position of the network gave leverage to the creditors. Gusinski was 
accused of misappropriation of funds in connection with a company "Russian Video” and shortly 
after arrested and put in a notoriously famous Butyrka prison. Nonetheless, the charges against 
him were dropped after Gusinsky agreed to sell a controlling stake in Media-Most to Gazprom-
Media. After a while disclosure of a secret agreement called “Protocol 6” (“shares of freedom”) 
between Gusinsky and Mikhail Lesin, the Minister of Media, followed. It confirmed that 
criminal process against Gusinsky and his associates was to be stopped if Gusinsky followed 
through on the sale of Media-Most. After the reveal of this information, the criminal 
investigations were restored. Gusinsky was charged with a criminal offence of fraud.  
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In 2001 Gazprom announced having acquired 46 per cent stake at NTV. The in the early 2000s 
the channel was still a leading independent media channel, although its editorial policy changed, 
and content such as acute political satire or government denouncing investigations disappeared.  
Despite the state officials insisting on the presence of the strong evidence against the accused, 
the administration’s interest in altering the media’s policy appeared to override the deliberation 
to prosecute criminals
41
. This case is a vivid example not only of the existent in Russia selective 
law enforcement but also of the readiness of the government to override the legitimate powers. 
The involvement of the cabinet of ministers in the negotiations between the creditor and debtors 
and threatening of criminal prosecution to win a deal over a television network are clearly 
signifying of the absence of the rule of law in the industry.  
 
2.2 Regional television and radio 
Russia is a multinational state with the largest territory in the world and great cultural differences 
between the ethnicities that inhabit it. That is why regional media play a very significant role in 
Russia by producing regional news and programs to adapting the content to the preferences of 
the audiences in certain regions. At the beginning of the century, when the economy of the 
country was going up with the inflow of oil money, the businesses were developing and that 
increased the demand for advertising in the regions, especially in the big cities. The richer was a 
city, the bigger the demand and paying capacity there were, the more developed local media 
grew. The number of channels and the scope of their activities was thus stipulated solely by 
economic solvency.  
In 2009 a Federal Program of transition to digital broadcasting “Development of Television and 
Radio Broadcasting in the Russian Federation in 2009 - 2015” was adopted. Digital broadcasting 
is a more advanced technology that allows to simultaneously transmit a whole package of 
channels (multiplex) on a single frequency. Similar transitional programs are implemented all 
over the world since the 1990s. This transition would change the whole structure of the market of 
TV broadcasting and define new ways of functioning of regional TV companies. In Russia, the 
switchover plan was under development since 1999 and was initially to be accomplished by 
2015. However, due to numerous challenges, such as a lack of investment in home television 
equipment, the creation of a national network of stable digital signal transmission and regional 
broadcasters’ access to digital multiplexes, the approximate date for disconnecting the analogue 
broadcast was postponed to the end of 2018 - the beginning of 2019. At the moment, almost all 
Russian population can receive the digital TV signal and analogue broadcast is being 
disconnected in some regions. According to the latest data from the Ministry of Digital 
Development, Communications and Mass Media, the disconnection of analogue broadcasting of 
TV channels of the first and second multiplexes is scheduled from February to June 2019.
42
. No 
one will disconnect the analogue broadcast, but the state stopped subsidizing the analogue 
distribution of channels of the first multiplex. Accordingly, after this, the redistribution of the 
market begins. 
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Theoretically, the switchover is supposed to increase the number of the channels available in 
some regions, by providing all-Russia transmission of two multiplexes, that total of 20-21 
channels, free of charge.  
The changes that accompany the switchover in practice imply the death of regional television in 
Russia. From now it is possible to acquire a license only for all-Russia broadcast, instead of a 
licence for a certain territory, as it used to be before. From a technical perspective, there is no 
need in such a change. The representation of regional television is reduced to one channel in the 
cable network. For each region, there will be provided one channel free of charge on the 21st 
button. The contest between the channels is very high, especially in the bigger cities and it will 
only suffice the main need in the news about regional news, but not allow for a creative approach 
to the creation of the content. The elimination of the competition of this kind leads to the barriers 
in the development of regional TV businesses.  
The opportunity for a network to be broadcasted nationwide via digital transmission is a very 
expensive one (for instance, a place in the second multiplex costs about 36 mln rubles plus the 
company has to pay for the expenses on building the infrastructure for digital transmission
43
). 
The worsening economic situation in Russia was reflected in a decrease in the advertising 
market, which brings the most profit for the regional channel, thus making them unable to afford 
digitalization.  
The following strategies can be undertaken for regional companies to survive in the harsh 
conditions of competition: 
(1) a horizontal merger of two, three, several local TV channels on geographical, national 
and other grounds;  
(2) partnership association at the local level, when several broadcasters occupy one 
frequency and divide its broadcasting, carrying out independent programming only a few 
hours a day; 
(3) switch to cable broadcasting;  
(4) switch to broadcasting via the Internet. 
44
 
The most likely option for most of the channels, however, will be relocating the channel to either 
internet or cable broadcast, or both of those. Many channels already now dub the broadcast on 
the Internet, and the overall trend suggests that this number was only to increase even without 
the shutdown of the analogue broadcast. The possibility to move to cable broadcasting also is 
viewed by many local companies as a priority development path. This is confirmed in the 
development strategy of television and radio broadcasting for the period up to 2025, which was 
developed by the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media. From another side, switching to 
cable will lead to a partial loss of the channel’s audience, since many viewers do not want any 
changes, they are satisfied with the simplicity and the minimum number of buttons, and are not 
interested in technological innovations, especially as they are the ones to pay for them (in 
particular, paying for a content of questionable quality sometimes). Regional television is faced 
with a choice: to go cable, to broadcast on the Internet, or to leave the air completely. 
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For such a multinational and multicultural country as Russia, with its vast territory, it is 
especially important to preserve regional television, as the local broadcasting remains the most 
efficient and sometimes the only source of information in remote areas of the province. 
The question of whether the changes related to digitalization were intentionally aimed to increase 
obstacles in the development of regional television and increase centralized control over the TV 
channels is ambiguous. From the one hand, such an approach would go in line perfectly with the 
current trends of tightening the policy of control over the media. At the same time, they are 
justified by the needs of adapting to technological development. A former owner of a Tomsk 
TV2 and media holding to which it belonged, Arkadij Mayofis believes that ‘killing’ of regional 
television was not the initial purpose of the government, although they managed to benefit from 
the coincidence
45
. The official hostility to the independent regional media can be observed in the 
point of view represented in 2016 Gazprom’s NTV film, where the authors accuse TV2 of being 
sponsored by the US.
46
 The owner of the channel in his turn has held the opinion that the 





2.3 Digital media 
The technological developments are bringing changes to the media landscape in Russia similar to 
the rest of the developed world. The increasing popularity of such media resources as online 
newspapers, social media and news applications are especially relevant for the younger segments 
of the population.  
The domestic internet service providers overrun the American rivals: Mail.ru Group and Yandex 
remained the dominant media holdings at the end of 2018, those projects hold the top two 
positions for weekly and monthly reach
48
.  The Mail.ru Group is an internet company that 
produces a total of twenty-one entertainment and e-commerce services and online 
communication platforms, which includes Mail.ru email service and Russia’s top popular social 
media Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki. According to the BBC data, in 2016 Internet holding the 
largest shareholders of the internet holding are South African media group Naspers (31.7%) and 
New Media Technologies (17.9%), which is controlled by Alisher Usmanov. NMT owns more 
than half of the voting shares of Mail.ru Group, which makes Usmanov the actual owner of this 
media holding. Usmanov has repeatedly expressed his admiration for Putin
49
. The second 
Russian internet giant is Yandex, which owns a total of the twenty-eight internet projects. Its 
search engine of the same name is the most popular in Russia. The company surrendered its 
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Another big player in the industry is Rambler & Co. It is one of the largest Russian groups of 
companies working in the field of media, technology and e-commerce. The project audience is 
over 40 million people per month. The group of companies includes such projects as email 
service, one of the largest Rambler portals in RuNet, the online news magazines Lenta.ru and 
Gazeta.ru, the entertainment Internet portal Afisha, the blog platform LiveJournal.com, the 
English-language online edition of INRUSSIA, the portal Rambler and projects related to it and 
various other (a total of more than 40). It is owned and run jointly by Vladimir Potanin and 
Alexander Mammut. A significant amount of the Rambler Group’s shares was bought out by 
Sberbank
51
.  The internet newspaper Lenta.ru was found to be the most frequently quoted news 
source for the Russian-language blogs
52
. After a warning from Roskomnadzor for a publication 
of an interview with one of the leaders of the Right Sector banned in Russia, the editor Galina 
Timchenko that was the head of the publication since 2004 was replaced by the owner of the 
publication with Aleksey Goreslavskiy, known for having a pro-kremlin position. After the 
dismissal, Timchenko has founded a digital news platform, that functioned on the basis of free 
mobile applications as a content aggregator. Timchenko decided that the registration of the new 
media outlet must be done outside Russian jurisdiction, preferably under the jurisdiction of the 
European Union, as this would prevent the state from being able to employ accusation of illegal 
activities to exert pressure over editorial policy
53
.  
Roskomanadzor was repeatedly accused of attempting to censor the Internet and violate freedom 
of speech by blocking websites and internet service providers under the guise of the protection of 
personal data or “protecting children from harmful information” or directly criticizing activity of 
the Government or Parliament of Russia. Nonetheless, the state representatives repeatedly talk 
about the necessity of the freedom of the Internet and claim the Russian internet to be free
54
. As 
for accusations of censorship, one of the explanations is, for instance, the absence of the 
audience interest to the opposition point of view
55
.  
Despite this, the history of the blocking of internet resources reveals a clear trend in oppressing 
the opposition. In 2014, Roskomnadzor on the request of the General Prosecutor’s Office, 
without a court decision, in relation to “Appeals to illegal activities and participation in mass 
events held in violation of the established procedure” limited access to three online media 
outlets: Grani.ru, Kasparov.ru and Daily Journal, all of which were representing the opposition 
point of view. A long history of persecution of opposition activist and founder of Anti-
Corruption Foundation Alexey Navalny also involved entering of his blog in LiveJournal into the 
banned registry and in the context of his presidential campaign Roskomnadzor has blocked the 
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site "Smart voting" 2019.vote because of a violation of the law on the protection of personal 
data.   
The websites of the oppositionist politician and entrepreneur Mikhail Khodorkovsky were a 
target of Roskomnadzor as well. In 2017 «MBH media" was entered into the list of banned 
websites. The prosecutor's office reasoned it with the opinion that the resource distributed 
"information materials of unwanted organizations." Despite the removal of the publications 
named violating the law, the site was now unblocked and later next year website mbk.news was 
blocked without explanation, provided that it mirrored the blocked website mbk.media.  
The increasing popularity of social media made it a target of the state attention as well. This is 
proved both by the legislative and judicial tendencies of the state activities. Apart from the 
increased legislative regulation, considered in the previous chapter, the increase in the number of 
criminal prosecutions also signifies of the tightening policy in relation to information on the 
Internet. The Decrees of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of June 28, 2011 No. 11 
“On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases on Extremist Crimes” and “On Amendments to the 
Decrees of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of February 9, 2012 No. 
1“ On Certain Issues of Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases crimes of a terrorist nature”, testify 
that recently there has been an increase in the number of citizens who were responsible for 
reposts that were found to constitute extremist content on social networks
56
. Needed to mention, 
that in many cases the information did not come directly from the citizens but was only 
distributed on the Internet using repost on social networking pages. This means that the 
defendants did not necessarily express their attitude to the information that they “reposted”, even 
more so, such actions do not imply a justification or public support of extremist activities. This 
problem was touched upon by the Supreme Court’s recommendations to the courts on how to 
handle cases of extremist publications in social networks, where it clarified that the thoughtless 
repost of extremist materials is not a crime. The Supreme Court stressed that the courts should 
base their decisions on the nature and degree of public danger of the offense, which is 
determined by the audience that sees the publication, and it should take into account the form, 
context and content of information, availability and content of comments or other expressions of 
attitude to the materials. The law providing for partial decriminalization of Article 282 of the 
Criminal Code that followed later proved that the earlier tightening measures that were not 
formulated clearly enough were also disproportional. Currently, criminal punishment follows 
only in case of there was a similar violation committed during earlier the same year. Otherwise, 




A distinctive case of persistence in the governmental intention to gain control over personal data 
has provoked the controversy with a Russian-based messenger service Telegram. Telegram is a 
cloud-based instant messaging and voice over IP service, that has gained worldwide popularity 
due to its privacy protection mechanisms. In the recent years it also evolved into a popular 
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platform for bloggers by providing an opportunity to reach large audiences instantly via a 
messaging channel. Telegram channels key differences from standard microblogging (such as 
Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr ...) are the absence of algorithmic news feeds, absence of feedback 
from subscribers and anonymity. The last one was the main advantage of the platform and the 
main cause for authorities’ dissatisfaction with it. It was impossible to claim that the domestic 
service is transferring personal data of its Russian users to foreign companies, like its foreign 
analogues, Facebook’s WhatsApp or Messenger, for instance, and thus there was less room for 
justifying the necessity of data retention by protection of national security. Nonetheless, the state 
demonstrated insistent interest in having the keys that would allow security services to decipher 
the encrypted mechanisms. It was reasoned with the service’s potential danger of providing the 
communications platform for illegal activities, such as terrorism and drug trafficking. Telegram 
was entered in Roskomnadzor’s blacklist, but its technological advancements soon allowed the 
users to bypass the blocking. 
Despite the state deliberation to block the messenger service, state officials themselves continue 
using the application. Furthermore, the popularity of the service as a mass media is utilized by 
the Kremlin as well. The dominance in the number of pro-Kremlin unanimous channels can be 
observed, and their ties to the administration surpassingly involves financial contracts
58
. By 
contrast, the author of the satiric Telegram channel was forced to disclose his unanimity under 
the pressure of the state-controlled media and has claimed to experience unreasoned interest of 
the law enforcement organs, which coincided with the disclosure of his identity
59
.  
With the newly accepted laws on fake news and the insult of the authorities, the censoring policy 
can extend even further. However, the first practice of the implementation of the law, although 




The decreasing popularity of printed media is a global trend, which can be observed in Russia as 
well. The decline in demand for printed media outlets is stipulated by their inability to compete 
with contemporary media resources that are easier accessible and have more convenient ways of 
the representing the information. Almost all bigger printed editorials, such as Moscow-based 
dailies and newspapers, as well as ones of the major economic centres, and have their 
publications duplicated in their internet or other digital platforms.  
Apart from the changes in the media consumption habits, several reasons lead to an inevitable 
decline of the press segment in Russia. These include the economic recession, which affected the 
advertising demand that is the primary source of revenues for the printed media especially, the 
legislative changes prohibiting tobacco and alcohol production advertisement in press 
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 and mass closures of press kiosk (most of them were unauthorized points of sales 
and were closed by orders of the regional authorities). Though the changes in the distribution 
structures of the printed press in the large industrial centres, are transforming the market. The 
ability to distribute the product in urban transportation and trade infrastructure lead to the shift 
from the partial reliance on the income from the sales of the physical products to profiting solely 
from advertisement and sponsorship. This is coherent with a global trend of establishment of 
new lifestyles and spreading popularity of the press free of charge.  
Russian national quality newspapers include both general interest and business dailies. The most 
popular ones of those are Izvestia, Kommersant, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
Vedomosti.  Izvestia is a pro-government newspaper, since it was acquired by Gazprom-Media 
in 2005, which now belongs to NMG holding; Kommersant is a business-oriented daily, that is a 
part of Alisher Usmanov’s Kommersant Publishing House; Rossiyskaya Gazeta is an official 
publisher of new laws, owned and funded by the state. Nezavisimaya Gazeta is a heavyweight 
broadsheet daily, owned and edited by businessman and politician Konstantin Remuchkov. 
Remuchkov insisted that the editorial policy of the newspaper was depending solely on himself, 
the journalist team and the readers, however, the claim is doubtful due to the information 
leakage, proving businessman’s ties to Kremlin.  Vedomosti is Russia's oldest newspaper, its 
modern version is a liberal daily business newspaper published since 1999. Its publications 
provide analysis and forecasts on economic, financial, corporate and political issues. Vedomosti 
is currently owned by the media entrepreneur Demyan Kudryavtsev, a former director of 
Kommaersant; prior to the legislative restriction of the foreign capital, the ownership was shared 
by the Finnish company Sanoma, US companies Dow Jones and Pearson (owner of Financial 
Times). This newspaper is one of the few Russian titles to operate a paywall for the web version 
of material from its print edition, which constitutes the main source of revenues for the outlet, 
allowing it to overcome the difficulties of the declining stage of the printed media market.  
Several main trends in the printed media sector in Russia can be identified. These include the 
media businesses seeking new production or distribution models, such as gradual shift from print 
to online publication, the diversification of the assets into all accessible segments of the media 
market, the changes in the ownership structures that followed the legislative changes of allowed 
foreign investment and consequently increasing role of the state support of the businesses. For 
instance, English-language newspaper The Moscow Times and weekly news magazine The New 
Times are still being published online, but the paper versions of both outlets stopped in 2017. 
The New Times was a target of Roskomnadzor’s warnings and administrative fines before it was 
sentences to pay over 22 mln rubbles fine in 2018, the largest fine in the history of Russian 
media, that in practical terms meant the death of the publication
62
. The Moscow Times fell under 
the scope of the foreign investment in media law, so that its previous owner, Sanoma, sold the 
publication to Demyan Kudryavtsev. The foreign investors that left Russian market, like the 
previous owners of Vedomosti and The Moscow Times, included the subsidiary of German 
publisher Alex Springer, which ran the Russian edition of Forbes magazine. Apart from using 
Forbes brand, the magazine was not otherwise connected to the US version. Prior to the sale, the 
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publication among all produced investigations of president Putin’s finances. However, after the 
changes in the ownership structure the level of independent journalism was lowered, and the 
workers have accused the new management of interference in their work
63
.  
RBC Group (or RosBiznesKonsalting) was yet another major media holding, whose main outlets 
covered the materials from a moderate liberal standpoint. The group’s assets included a daily 
analytical newspaper “RBC”, and monthly business magazine of the same name. Until recently, 
RBC media was the source of most of the in-depth business investigations and reports. It covered 
the issues of the obscure business dealings of Putin’s circle and his confidants, including family 
members or the circumstances of the events of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Under the 
ownership of tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov, RBC’s journalist team enjoyed the opportunity to dig in 
and publish sometimes controversial materials, mainly related to business or financial issues. 
The company’s products were particularly valuable because of their appeal to facts and objective 
conclusions. Compared to other media resources, RBC was starting to look more and more 
defiant, despite the fact that they only used the data in the in open access for their investigations, 
only difference being that all the other publications did not collect it and did not analyse. The 
scandalous reveal of Panama Papers did not bypass the editorial’s attention and an independent 
investigations and information were published about the involvement of president’s friends and a 
number of state officials in the offshores activities that involved transactions for large sums of 
money
64
. Together with the investigations concerning the identity of the president’s daughter65, 
these publications have provoked the government to exert pressure over the media holding. Soon 
after the investigations were published, raids of tax police in “ONEXIM”, Prokhorov's 
investment group that owned a major stake in most of the assets of media holding, and 
accusation of tax evasion followed. Despite the absence of any direct pretensions to the media 
holding itself, the criminal prosecution was threatening other, more profitable businesses of the 
“ONEXIM” group. The state officials denied any interrelations between these events66. 
Nonetheless, soon after the dismissal of the editor’s team of the media holding, including the 
chief editors of the holding, the newspaper and the news agency, the accusations were dropped. 
The new managers appointed at their positions used to work for the state news agency TASS and 
as editors of the Kommersant newspaper in the past. The departure of media group editors was 
“a serious blow” for independent journalism in Russia67. Not only this affected the editorial 
policy of this particular media outlet, it has also showed what is to happen to the ones standing in 
the way of Kremlin and its inhabitants.  In 2017 a major stake in and the liabilities of the 
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The long-term economic decrease of the publishing market made it generally unattractive for 
private investment. Nowadays the press market in Russia is characterized with a particularly 
prevalent role of local and regional authorities, who own a dominant number of media 
companies, especially in the regional market. The regional press becomes dependent on 
subsidies from local authorities to survive the decrease of advertising markets. 
One of the ways to avoid the threats for the printed media business is seen in the diversification 
of the assets. This applies to digital media, as well as to other media sectors. For instance, apart 
from various print editions, Komsomolskaya Pravda publishing house also runs websites, mobile 
applications and radio station; NMG has introduced “Izvestia” Multimedia Information Centre - 
Russia's first private multimedia information centre, which combined the editorial and 
technological capabilities of the news services of the TV channels REN, Fifth Channel and the 
Izvestia newspaper for production of multi-format information content for TV, print and the 
Internet. 
 
PART 3. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter the author intends to identify the main challenges in the media industry in Russia 
nowadays. From the issues raised in the previous chapter, it follows that the media industry is 
facing a difficult period with severe problems, such as lack of competition, lower standards of 
journalistic work and growing paranoia. In this chapter the author provides the analysis of the 
implication of these factors on the business environment. Currently the main key features of 
Russian media system include the economic, audience and information prevalence of terrestrial 
television, the high level of concentration of the financial resources in the leading segments of 
the media industry and high level of state component in the media capital and domination of 
federal companies both economically and in terms of audience
69
. Apart from that, the 
advertising-based business model remains to be the most popular when compared to the new 
evolving business models. The prospects of the media industry are likely to follow the inertial 
development model, that is characterized by following the present trends rather than gradual 
introduction of and adapting to disruptive technologies and know-hows
70
. This implies that the 
current problematic traits are either to escalate or to be managed constrainedly. 
 
3.1 Uncertainty of the rules  
 
The first and the most significant issue of the existent media landscape is the political and legal 
aspects of the uncertainty of the rules of the game. The threat to the independent media drives 
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away the potentially interested investors. The case studies provided in the previous chapter 
reveal how the volatility of the media can be overridden by the state interference in its work. As 
mentioned by our interviewee, “No businessman today will not invest in the mass media, which 
does news, for example - just because it is dangerous for their primary business”71. The potential 
possibility of the Roskomnadzor’s measures such as blocking withdrawal of the license to 
broadcast are threatening the viability of the media outlet itself, and the threat of criminal 
prosecution and invoking personal liability of the owners in order to exert pressure on the 
editorial policy of the media are deemed to cause danger for the other activities of the investors.  
 
 
3.2 Entry barriers 
 
The rapidly changing social and technological environment stipulates the broad horizon of 
opportunities for emerging media, including both traditional audio-visual broadcast and printed 
media and, more importantly, digital media and internet-platforms. Although traditional media is 
less malleable to innovation, due to the relatively slow tempo of changes towards developing 
methods of communications that are inherent for the general population in Russia, the traditional 
media is not likely to change drastically or die out in the nearest future. Thus, its development 
relies highly on the abilities and opportunities to produce better content rather than on game-
changing novelties. The stagnating oligopolistic market, however, is not a fertile soil to start new 
businesses. The decreasing demand for printed press, digitalization of terrestrial television and 
radio create entry barriers that lower potential for the start-ups in these markets. Overall, the 
market is in declining stage of development, apart from the digital media sector
72
. Internet has 
already overridden television, the most popular media in Russia, in the revenues from 
advertising
73
, and this trend is only expected to escalate. The digital media ecosystem, in turn, 
provides massive opportunities for development and growth. It is possible to introduce new 
formats of representation of the content and new ways of communicating it to the consumers. 
The new approaches to digital media market are projected to involve higher use of personalized 
data and technological support of personalization of selection and content delivery, more 
efficient tools for the collection and analysis of consumer behaviour and overall increase both in 
the access to and demand for the digital content
74
. Moreover, the audience of other traditional 
media will shift gradually to the internet to satisfy the needs which the traditional media 
previously used to suffice. This altogether is capable of creating a prosperous field for business 
development. The legislative and political factor, however, might undermine the desire of the 
newcomers to enter the market. Firstly, the already existing legislative restrictions and their use 
by the executive organs pose a threat to any media business, not only those connected to politics 
because of their inherent uncertainty and inconsistency in implementation. Furthermore, the 
project provided in Sovereign Internet Law can also repel those potentially interested in new 
ventures that involve reliance of the internet in Russia. Despite little changes at the initial stage, 
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the actual disconnection from the global web that might follow would lead to major distortion of 
the internet connection and the work of all services that rely on the internet
75
. The licensing 
policy of Roskomnadzor is yet another barrier to entering the market.  
Consequently, these factors determine the market as highly unattractive for private investment. 
The foreign interest in participation is already reduced to none as there are too many obstacles 
that are not worth the effort, as the market is not big enough, while the attractiveness for 
domestic investors is also falling rapidly.  This leads to the following problem, which is a high 
reliance on the state support of the media businesses. 
 
 
3.3 State financing  
 
Already now, the biggest market share in the Russian media market belongs to the state or 
“semi-state” media. State media are the ones clearly owned by the state, like Channel 1, VGTRK 
or Russia Today; “semi-state” in turn are those which formally meet the criteria of private 
enterprises, but are indirectly owned and controlled by the state, like for example, Gazprom’s 
GMH. The third type is nominally in the hands of private individuals, for example, oligarchs 
close to the Kremlin, but in reality this is just a formality of the ownership. All these companies 
receive directly or sometimes in a slightly veiled form subsidies from the state. For the major 
media, such as the first channel or VGTRK these are extremely large sums of money. The 
official data from Ministry of Finance reveals the state expenditures on the mass media total of 
76, 83, 88 billion of rubbles in the years 2016, 2017, 2018 respectively
76
, which constitutes 
nearly two per cent of total federal budget expenditures. The main recipient of was VGTRK 
television: in 2018 it received a total of 24.6 billion rubbles from the federal budget, a billion 
more than in the previous year, and in 2019 and 2020, the planned amounts are less - around 21 
billion rubbles for each year
77
. The second among TV broadcasters in terms of subsidies was 
ANO TV-News, which owns and produces content for RT, receiving around 20 billion per 
year
78
. The high level of the expenditures in 2018 was justified by the promotion of a major 
international sports event that took place in Russia and the planned transition to digital broadcast. 
The key state program, “Information Society”, according to which the money goes to media 
holding was designed for 2011–202079. This supposedly means that state financing is to be 
reduced in the following years. However, this seems very unlikely, keeping in mind the current 
state of the industry. Most probably, the state will have to continue the donations either in the 
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open form or bypassing the officially stated budget, because it is the only way to keep the same 





In the market where some of the players can benefit from stable and generous state funding, 
healthy competition is impossible.  
The money donated to some media holdings largely pays for their expenses for production, the 
wages, purchases of rights, and so on. But at the same time, these media are present at the 
advertising market, they sell advertisements in the same way as fully commercial channels or 
other media outlets, so that they must compete on equal terms. As explained by one of our 
respondents,  
Fair competition is absolutely impossible in a situation where, say, we sell bakery on the market, 
but at the same time they [the state] give me money for flour, a free oven and it also allows us to 
hire a hundred workers not at the expense of selling cakes, but at the expense of the state budget. 
I will be able to offer a price that you [the competitors] can never offer, you can never compete 
with me in this situation. But it is precisely this position in which Russian state media are. Of 
course, there is a huge degree of monopolization of the market - in fact, all the major media in 




Moreover, the effect of state interference is two-sided. Apart from certain media benefiting from 
state protectionism, the other ones are suffering from the lack of security.  The monopolization 
of the market is possible and even inevitable not only because of the state support for pro-
Kremlin or apolitical, although still state-controlled, media, but also because independent media 
are facing difficulties of insecure legal and political environment. The state policy has nearly 
completely destabilized the legal basis for the proper functioning of the independent media by 
imposing obscure restrictions and implementing selective law enforcement. Thus, state 
interference in the media business in Russia affects the competition from two sides: from the one 
hand, there is state support for pro-Kremlin or apolitical, although still state-controlled, media, 
and on the other hand, the independent media are facing difficulties of insecure legal and 
political environment. In this situation a healthy competition is impossible.  
 
 
3.6 Lack of judicial protection  
 
From the various cases described in the previous chapter it is clear that nearly any media in 
Russia now can be destroyed without a lot of effort and social response even if it behaves 
rationally and tries not to violate any law. Apart from the cases where the ground for convicting 
an unfavourable media outlet is deliberately found or created by the prosecutors to exert pressure 
over it, one must consider the cases of legal proceeding against the state-related persons or 
organisations that concern a real conflict of interests or violations of rights. In the current regime, 
there little chance of court decision in favour of the media, especially in the proceedings that 
concern political figures or state companies. The situation worsened due to several reasons. The 
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first one concerns the changes in the judicial system in Russia: The Supreme Court of Arbitration 
of the Russian Federation was liquidated, and the system of lower arbitration courts has been 
greatly changed. The Supreme Arbitration Court was characterised as an example of 
transparency, high qualification of the judges and a strive to form a predictable practice, while 
quite often making rulings against the state bodies
81
. With its liquidation, both arbitration courts 
and the courts of general jurisdiction are headed by the Supreme Court, which is less 
independent and transparent
82
. Another reason lies in the increase in the legal limitations on the 
media activities, the ambiguity of these rules and poor quality of the newly accepted laws
83
. One 
of the specifics of the judicial practice in Russia is that frequent verdicts of acquittal of a judge 
are a reason for scrutiny of his or her decisions. It is especially relevant for criminal prosecution, 
where the number of the acquittal decisions in the judge’s career is none or close to none. Thus, 
the judicial system represents an efficient mechanism for condemnation rather than a protection 
of rights and interests of the citizens.  
However, in the cases of no interest to the government one can still seek justice and protection. 
In practice, most of the conflicts in the media industry are the ones that are regulated by the Civil 
Code, not litigations against the authorities. In principle, in cases like pleas of protection of 
honour, dignity and business reputation or claims of copyright infringement, the horizontal 
relationship between the parties normally would not involve the pressure from the ‘above’. The 
exception though stems from the interconnection between some of the media owners and the 
government.  The growing influence of the state on the media through private businesses or 
particular persons means the spread of the state interests. Thus, statistically, the number of cases 
where the principles of rule of law and fair trial are implemented is becoming less. “...a lawyer, 
just competently performing his work, can predict what the court decision will be. Wherever the 
state participates, and there are more such cases, the court experiences influence that has become 
more difficult to overcome”84.  Both of the respondents also notice, that the law itself is not the 
main problem, and it is the intention of the legislator and the way the law is implemented, that 




3.7 Quality of the content 
 
One of the main results of such a system, that has been formed in Russia by now, is the negative 
impact on the quality of the content. It includes both the information that the end users get and 
the way that this information is presented, whether this is news, opinions, or even entertainment. 
In a situation when the market is stagnating and there is a lack of investment, the opportunity of 
resurrection lies in creative and innovative approaches to modification of the business at all 
stages of the value chain. The quality of the end product though remains the main indicator of 
the production efficiency and determines level of the consumers’ satisfaction. 
The production of quality content depends not only on the available financial resources, but on 
human resources even more. The existence of the professionals that are capable of creating the 
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quality product is determined by the education system and preparation of staff. In these terms, 
the sphere of journalism seems to be hindered the most.  
Certainly, it [the state] influences absolutely everything, starting from the training of 
professionals, studying in universities, the education of sensible, free-minded people who are 
inculcated with the values of a democratic society and independent press. I think that these issues 
today are paid less and less attention to in universities, and the during their practice the 
specialists, students then see, not only in textbooks but also in life, what is happening. And, 
strictly speaking, the independent journalism, investigative journalism, or different points of view, 
in general, are just out of the question, as everyone realizes that it is impossible, or just having no 
example of how it works.
86
  
The entertainment sector is surely less affected by the state interference. However, the state 
intention to control the information sphere results in the factual control of all media with the 
subsequent lack of healthy competition. Thus, the entertainment media also experience the lack 
of incentives to grow and develop good specialists.   
From the consumers perspective, such a situation signifies of a loss, because, even if there is a 





The ambiguous character of many legislative sources, vague and obscure wording of the 
statutory texts and lack of coherence in judicial interpretation of those leads to chilling effects on 
the already malfunctioning rule of law in Russia. The introduction of the new mass media 
regulations and the tightening sanctions for the non-performance indicate the emergence of the 
new legal environment, which can be difficult for the business to adapt to. 
The increasing governmental control over the media displayed in the pressure over independent 
media outlets results in several threats for the development of the industry. Media businesses are 
becoming more financially dependent on the state’s support which subsequently leads to serving 
the needs of the government rather than the society. A current situation of obscure rules of the 
game and unspoken but generally accepted censorship eliminates the possibility of healthy 
competition. The companies are often unable to withstand scrutiny by the law-enforcement 
agencies and thus are either forced to surrender their independence or exit the business. The high 
dependency on the approved editorial policy prevents the publishers from relying on the market-
driven demands of the audience, while the lack of competition averts media from striving to 
produce high-quality content.  
Innovation and advancement that are particularly crucial for this industry are slow, gradual and 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. This is reasoned, firstly, by the audience’s preferences 
and secondly, limited competition. The intentions of the state to increase restrictions in the 
digital space, although not always successful, are nonetheless preventive in terms of the 
development of new business models and popularization of disruptive technologies. 
Thus, despite the presence of legal basis for the functioning of the independent media, the 
practical implementation of the existing rules which involves cherry picking in condemnation 
and prosecution and in some cases even the abuse of powers by the state for the purposes of 
preserving the authority are destabilising the foundation of the industry. 
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The issues considered in this paper require further investigation. A more precise understanding 
of the business environment can be achieved by examining the advertising market in Russia, as 
to it is a predetermining factor for the development of media as a business.  Moreover, the search 
for the rule of law in Russia presupposes in-depth research of judicial practice with a special 
focus on the regional court decisions. One of the characteristics of the Russian specific approach 
to justice is the lack of transparency and publicity in the work of the judicial system. At the 
moment, the visible effects of such an approach can be observed and analysed, but the possibility 
to combat the problems lies in understanding of their core. 
The goal of this paper was to find out how does the legislative policy and state intervention in 
media business affect the media industry in Russia. The conclusion based on the evidence 
considered in the work is that the problems that threaten the development of the media industry 
are aggravated by the state intention to gain complete control over the information sphere. The 
market share controlled by the state combined with trends in legislation and realities of the law 
enforcement in Russia lead to overall decline of mass media as a business and affect the society 





As a part of a thesis “The legality of the governmental control of Russian media and its effect on 
media business” work, two interviews were conducted.  
The first interviewee was a representative of regional television, Arkadij Mayofis, who was the 
head of a Tomsk TV channel TV and is the owner of Tomsk Media Group - the holding which 
included regional TV-channels, production studio, news agency, a number of radio channels and 
advertising companies. TV2 was founded in 1990, during the time of its operation the channel 
gained recognition and became famous for its investigative stories and news, it has won various 
journalistic awards, including national prize TEFI. In 2014 the channel underwent technical 
difficulties in broadcasting, and later that year the broadcasting license was not prolonged by 
Roskomnadzor. In January 2015 the channel stopped broadcasting. 
The interview took place on the 22/04/2018 via Facebook call. For the convenience of the 
interviewee, it was done in Russian and then the text was translated into English by the author of 
the work. In the following appendix to the work, one can find the transcript of the original text 
and its translation into English. 
The second interview is Feodor Kravchenko, a managing partner of Media Lawyers Collegium 
and practising lawyer, specializing in media law, IP, legal regulation of advertising, licensing in 
the field of media and telecommunications, protection of honour, dignity and business 
reputation, protection of confidential information and other areas of information law. The 





Interview 1.  
 
  
1. How do you assess the existing legislation regulating the activities of the media in the 
Russian Federation? Recently, several laws have been passed that restrict the activities of 
the media. What are the real goals of these measures? 
The ultimate goal of many laws in Russia, including these, is to preserve the existing power as 
long as possible. It is clear that the media, which conduct an independent editorial policy do not 
suit the authorities. In Russia, not everything is regulated by law: we know examples, when the 
law was great, but the practice of their execution or not execution, on the contrary, led to the fact 
that independent media were closed. Therefore, very little depends on what legislation in Russia 
today is. Everything in Russia is now centralized so that it is in the hands of one person and his 
apparatus in the form of the presidential administration and the Federal Security Service as 
watchdogs of this regime. Therefore, the issue is not in the legislation. It is all about the regime. 
2. What is the role of the state in the development of media business in Russia? Is the role 
of the state in the industry limited only by preventing the emergence/operation of 
publications/channels/ sources, or does the influence of the state extend wider and affect 
the business of non-political media? 
Certainly, it influences absolutely everything, starting from the training of professionals, 
studying in universities, the education of sensible, free-minded people who are inculcated with 
the values of a democratic society and an independent press. I think that these issues today are 
paid less and less attention to in universities, and the during their practice the specialists, students 
then see, not only in textbooks but also in life, what is happening. And, strictly speaking, the 
independent journalism, investigative journalism, or different points of view, in general, are just 
out of the question, as everyone realizes that it is impossible, or just having no example of how it 
works. The same goes for entertainment media. There is an unwritten contract of the owners that 
they entertain not only because it is needed by the audience, but because they cannot do anything 
else. No businessman today will not invest in the mass media, which does news, for example - 
just because it is dangerous for their primary business. In short, from which side do not look, 
everywhere are obstacles that hinder the existence of normal mass media economically, 
politically, and ideologically. 
3. How has the industry changed compared to the beginning of the 2000s? How do you see 
the development of media business in Russia in the future? 
The media business cannot exist separately from the situation in the country, economic and 
political, therefore, if the situation in the country worsens and toughens (and I have no doubt that 
it will follow), then the media live through not the best times: in fact, their remains, since today 
there is almost no normal media on traditional mediums, and the Internet is also under attack, 
and it will only get worse, from my point of view. 
As for the difference from what was happening in the two thousandths, the situation began to 
deteriorate precisely at this time, with Putin’s advent to power. But then, economically the mass 
media were able to survive and even develop, because the economy began to swell with oil 
money, and this could not but affect the media that live on advertising - and the advertisers were 
living better, economically. It was a period of economic heyday of the media, and at the same 
time, simultaneously, the strangulation of independence went on all fronts already, and in this 
sense, now it is only the continuation of what was started in the 2000s. 
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4. What, in your opinion, is the role of the Internet and new technologies in the 
development of the market in Russia? 
Predominant, as in the rest of the world. More and more people prefer Internet platforms to meet 
their interests in information, entertainment, and many others and so it will continue. It is clear 
that the phones, in which the most part of people’s life is concentrated nowadays, are going to 
play a major role and the media will go out looking for formats related to the phone, fitting the 
perception via mobile phones. It will all happen inevitably, another story is that the government 
is trying to regulate these areas, somewhere successfully, somewhere not (in case of app. 
“Telegram”, not very successfully). What will happen tomorrow? The state is preparing, 
investing big money to regulate it. Obviously, this cannot last forever. But, as I have already 
said, the collapse of state policy will happen only with the collapse of the state as it is today. 
5. Do you think the elimination of regional television was one of the goals of the transition 
to digital broadcasting or was it rather a “side effect”, and this transition was inevitable 
only as of the next step in the development of technology? 
I don’t think that it was exactly the initial task, that the question was “how do we destroy the 
regional media?” - “Well, let's introduce digitalization, in order to destroy...” Most likely, these 
are two parallel processes, digitalization is like the inevitable stage in the technical development 
of this industry, and the destruction of any independent media, not only regional, as a separately 
worthwhile goal. And at some point, they realized that it could be connected, so they 
successfully did it, connected those. They succeed very well when it is about killing, destroying, 
demolishing; it is much more difficult to create, develop, for this a completely different type of 
statehood is needed than the one that now exists in Russia. 
6. There is a point of view that the closure of TV2 (the Tomsk media group) was a kind of 
testing of public opinion before the closure of regional TV companies in relation to the 
switchover. What do you think about it? And, in your opinion, how could a stronger public 
reaction affect the further development of events, both with TV2 and with the entire 
branch of regional television? 
I do not think that it was testing, because, at that moment when TV2 was being destroyed, the 
state absolutely didn’t care about public opinion. It has already produced a huge amount of 
actions in this area and in all the others that could have caused some kind of protest, but, firstly, 
they did not cause, and secondly, if they did, there was no response to that. Today, the state 
doesn’t care what people think about certain actions, and, generally, the state is right, as the 
people eat it all up and continue to vote “correctly”. So, TV2 - it was a specific task, they didn’t 
show anything to anyone, it was just necessary to destroy us. And at the same time, it turned out 
that this showed how the state will deal with everyone who was like us. But I think that this was 
a side target. 
Original text in Russian 
1. Как вы оцениваете существующее законодательство, регулирующее деятельность 
СМИ в РФ?  За последнее время был принят ряд законов, ограничивающих деятельность 
медиа - каковы настоящие цели принятия этих мер? 
Окончательная цель очень многих законов в России, в том числе и этих, заключается в 
том, чтобы сохранить существующую власть как можно дольше. Понятно, что СМИ, 
которые занимают независимую от властей политику, ведут редакционную политику 
34 
 
самостоятельную, не устраивают власть. В России же не все регулируется законами: 
мы знаем примеры. когда законы были прекрасные, а практика их применения или 
неприменения, наоборот, приводила к тому, что независимые СМИ закрывались. 
Поэтому, по большому счету, оттого, какое законодательство сегодня в России, 
зависит очень мало. Все сейчас в России настолько централизовано, что находится в 
руках одного человека и его аппарата в виде администрации президента и Федеральной 
Службы Безопасности как сторожевых псов этого режима. Поэтому, дело не в 
законодательстве. Дело в режиме. 
2.   Какова роль государства в развитии медиабизнеса в России? Ограничивается ли роль 
государства в индустрии только препятствованием возникновения/работы 
оппозиционных изданий/каналов/источников, или влияние государства простирается 
шире, влияет на бизнес аполитичных медиа? 
Безусловно, влияет абсолютно на все, начиная от подготовки профессионалов, обучения 
в университетах, там тоже сужается поляна для воспитания здравомыслящих, 
свободных людей, которым прививаются ценности демократического общества и 
независимой прессы. Я думаю, что этим вопросам сегодня уделяется внимания в 
университетах все меньше и меньше, а практика такова. что специалисты не только в 
учебниках, но и в жизни видят, что происходит, и, собственно говоря, о независимой 
журналистике, о расследовательской журналистике, или вообще о журналистике и 
разных точках зрения просто и речи не ведут, понимая, что это или невозможно, или 
не видя, как это работает. То же самое касается и развлекательных СМИ. 
Существует такой негласный договор хозяев о том, что они развлекают не только 
потому, что это нужно зрителям, но потому что другим заниматься ничем нельзя. 
Никакой вменяемый сегодня бизнесмен не станет инвестировать в средства массовой 
информации, которое занимается новостями, например. Просто, потому что это 
опасно для его основного бизнеса. Короче говоря, с какой стороны не кинь, везде клин, 
препятствующий существованию и экономически, и политически, идеологически, 
нормальных средств массовой информации. 
3.  Как изменилась индустрия по сравнению с началом нулевых? Каким Вам видится 
развитие медиабизнеса в России в будущем? 
Медиа бизнес не может существовать отдельно от ситуации в стране, экономической 
и политической, поэтому, если ситуация в стране будет ухудшаться и ужесточаться 
(а у меня нет никаких сомнений, что она пойдет именно по этому пути), то и медиа 
будут переживать не лучшие времена - по сути, их остатки, так как сегодня уже 
практически нет нормальных медиа на традиционных носителях, а на интернет тоже 
идет наступление, и будет только хуже, с моей точки зрения. 
Что касается разницы между тем, что было в двухтысячные годы, то как раз 
ситуация ухудшаться стала именно в это время, с приходом Путина к власти. Но 
тогда экономически средства массовой информации еще способны были выживать и 
даже развиваться, потому что экономика начала пухнуть от нефтяных денег, и это не 
могло не сказаться на средствах массовой информации, которые живут с рекламы. 
потому что их рекламодатели стали жить экономически лучше. Это был период 
экономического расцвета средств массовой информации, и при этом параллельно 
удушения независимости шло по всем фронтам уже, и в этом смысле, сейчас лишь 
продолжение того, что было начато в двухтысячные годы. 




Преобладающая, как и во всем мире. Все больше и больше людей предпочитают 
интернет-платформы для удовлетворения своих интересов информационных, 
развлекательных, каких-либо еще. И так будет происходить дальше. Понятно, что 
роль телефона, в котором сосредоточена большая, если не большая, часть жизни 
человека, начинает играть все большую и большую роль, и медиа будут переходить 
туда и будут искать форматы, связанные с телефоном, облегающие восприятие по 
телефону. Это все будет происходить неизбежно, другой разговор, что эти сферы 
государство пытается регулировать каким-то образом, где-то успешно, где-то нет (с 
Телеграмом - не очень успешно). Что будет завтра? Государство готовится, 
вкладывает большие деньги, чтобы это регулировать. Очевидно, что бесконечно долго 
это продолжаться не может. Но, как я уже говорил, крах произойдет политики 
государственной только с крахом того государства, в каком виде оно сегодня 
существует. 
5. Как Вы считаете, было ли устранение регионального телевидения одной из целей 
перехода на цифровое вещание или же это скорее “побочный эффект”, и этот переход 
был неизбежным только как следующий шаг, учитывая развитие технологий? 
Я не думаю, что последовательно задача была именно такая, что стоял вопрос “как 
нам уничтожить региональные медиа?”  - “А, вот, давайте цифровизацию введем для 
того, чтобы уничтожить.” Скорее всего, это два параллельных процесса, 
цифровизация - как неизбежный этап в техническом развитии этой отрасли, и 
уничтожение независимых любых СМИ, не только региональных, как отдельно 
стоящая цель. А в какой-то момент они поняли, что это можно соединить, и успешно 
с этим справились, соединили. Все, что касается убить, уничтожить, подмять, это у 
них очень хорошо получается, гораздо сложнее получается создать, развить, для этого 
нужен совершенно другой тип устройства государственности, нежели тот, который 
сейчас существует в России. 
6. Существует точка зрения, что закрытие ТВ2 (томской медиа группы) было своего рода 
тестированием общественного мнения перед закрытием региональных телекомпаний в 
связи с цифровизацией. Что Вы думаете об этом? И, как на Ваш взгляд, мог бы более 
сильный общественный резонанс повлиять на дальнейшее развитие событий, как с ТВ2, 
так и со всей отраслью регионального телевидения? 
Не думаю, что это было тестирование, потому что в тот момент, когда ТВ2 
уничтожалось, государству было уже абсолютно наплевать на общественное мнение. 
Оно уже произвело огромное количество действий в этой сфере и во всех остальных, 
которые могли бы вызвать какой то протест, но, во-первых, не вызвали, а во-вторых, 
если и вызвали, то на это не было никакой реакции. Сегодня государству абсолютно все 
равно, что думают люди по поводу тех или иных их действий, и, как правило, оно, 
государство право, так как народ все это съедает и продолжает голосовать 
“правильно”. Так что, ТВ2 — это была такая задача специфическая, никому они ничего 
этим не показали, просто нужно было нас уничтожить. А заодно и выяснилось, что 
это продемонстрировало то, как государство будет поступать со всеми, кто был на 
нас похож. Но я думаю. что это была побочная цель. 
 
Interview 2.  
 
1. На протяжении последних нескольких лет в законодательных инициативах в России 
прослеживаются явные тенденции ограничений в области информации и иностранного 




По поводу ограничений в сфере иностранного участия: судя по всему, правительство 
(т.е. Кремль) поставило стратегическую задачу исключить вообще любое участие 
иностранного бизнеса в российских СМИ, практически любых влиятельных. то есть 
можно точно сказать что иностранцы не могут участвовать в современном российском 
медиа бизнесе, даже если он носит не политический, а развлекательный характер. в 
этом смысле интересно посмотреть на пример Романа Абрамовича, который остается 
достаточно лояльным Кремлю. Когда он относительно недавно получил гражданство 
Израиля, ему пришлось во исполнение поправок в статье 19.1, 19.2 продать 
принадлежащий его подконтрольным компаниям контрольный пакет акций Первого 
Канала. Такой запрет на всякое иностранное участие в российских медиа с юридической 
точки зрения не был нужен или полезен и носит абсолютно бессмысленный характер, 
поскольку еще несколько лет назад были приняты изменения в антимонопольное 
законодательство, которые позволяли Федеральной Антимонопольной Службе, которая 
подконтрольна правительству, одобрять или не одобрять крупные сделки с медиа 
активами. Таким образом. у Кремля и раньше была возможность регулировать эту 
сферу, и принятием поправок, полностью запретивших иностранное участие в 
российских СМИ, Кремль не расширил свои возможности, а наоборот их сузил. Поэтому, 
я думаю, речь идет не о какой-то юридической необходимости, а скорее о жестком 
политическом решении, декларации, что в России никаких иностранцев в области СМИ 
быть не должно в принципе.  
Но еще до того, как были приняты все эти законодательные запреты на иностранное 
участие в СМИ, российский медиа бизнес стал терять всякую привлекательность для 
зарубежных бизнесменов, и это было связано с тем, что российский медиа рынок не 
вполне здоровый. На российском медиа рынке есть очень большая доля государственных 
и полугосударственных СМИ. Государственные - те напрямую принадлежащие 
правительству, например ВГТРК, а полугосударственные, это те, которые 
принадлежат, например, Газпром Медиа, которые формально соответствуют 
критерию частных, но находятся в опосредованной собственности государства. Есть 
еще третий вид СМИ, которые номинально находятся в руках частных лиц, например, 
олигархов, близких к кремлю,  Ротенберги, например, или Ковальчук, но на самом дел это 
просто формальная форма собственности, конечно, это просто другое лицо Путина, но 
это все тот же Путин, без каких-либо содержательных, сущностных отличий. 
Соответственно, эти государственные и полугосударственные СМИ получают из 
бюджета напрямую или в немного завуалированной форме очень большие субсидии и 
дотации. К примеру, для таких СМИ, как первый канал, ВГТРК, речь идет о сумме около 
миллиарда долларов в год, или десятков миллионов рублей в год, и эти деньги просто 
безвозмездно передаются соответствующим медиа холдингам, что в значительной 
степени окупает их расходы на производство, на заработные платы, на покупку прав и 
так далее. Но, помимо этого, те же каналы полностью присутствуют на рекламном 
рынке, точно так же продают рекламу, как и полностью коммерческие каналы и 
конкурировать им приходится на равных. Но честная конкуренция абсолютно исключена 
в ситуации, когда, скажем, мы с вами продаем пирожки на рынке, но мне при этом дают 
деньги на муку, бесплатную печь и еще позволяют нанять сто рабочих не за счет денег с 
продажи пирожков, а за счет государственного бюджета. Понятно, что я смогу 
предложить такую цену, какую вы никогда предложить не сможете, вы никогда не 
сможете со мной конкурировать в этой ситуации. Но именно в таком положении 
находятся российские государственные СМИ, и. конечно, у них огромная степень 
монополизации рынка - фактически, все крупные СМИ в России так или иначе 
принадлежат государству. Это первая причина, почему я говорю, что российский 
медийный рынок не совсем здоровый. Это не гигантский рынок. Да, он достаточно 
большой, но не феноменальный. При этом доля телевидения была преобладающей, и она 
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начинает сокращаться и сейчас доля доходов интернет-СМИ догнала телевизионные, 
обогнала, и, скорее всего, это навсегда; доля печатных СМИ стабильно снижается; доля 
радио падает еще быстрее. Таким образом, в целом, российский рынок не является 
растущим, если не брать в расчет интернет-СМИ. И этот рынок со временем 
становился все менее и менее привлекательным для иностранных инвесторов, потому 
что на нем постоянно, в геометрической прогрессии росли юридические и политические 
риски. То есть, в России вообще собственность не является неприкосновенной, и если 
потребуется, то эту собственность могут отобрать через правоохранительные органы 
и это в полной мере касается медиа активов. Но, плюс к тому, каждый год принимались 
новые и новые законы, по которым можно было лишить медийные компании лицензии или 
наложить огромные штрафы, или признать свидетельства о регистрации СМИ 
недействительным, или возбудить уголовное дело. То есть, делать какой-то контент, 
предсказуемо понимая, что за него не последует штрафов, в России становилось все 
менее и менее возможным. Иностранцы очень любят предсказуемость в своем бизнесе, 
но получалось так, что доходы падают, а риски растут, и в какой-то момент эти две 
кривые пересеклись, и сейчас я могу сказать, что даже для российского бизнеса 
инвестиции в масс-медиа абсолютно непривлекательны, если, повторюсь, не учитывать 
интернет-сектор. Довольно резкое заявление, но я рискну его сделать: в России сейчас 
СМИ как бизнес не существует, потому что риски слишком высоки, а доходы слишком 
низкие.  
 
2. Цифровые медиа, и социальные медиа, в частности, играют все большую роль в сфере 
массовых коммуникаций. Как влияют изменения в законодательстве на развитие 
цифровых медиа в России и, наоборот, реагирует ли законодатель на появление новых 
медиа технологий? 
 
На мой взгляд, было две эпохи в отношениях российского законодателя и цифровых 
медиа. Первая эпоха характеризовалась невмешательством. Довольно долгие годы 
правительство и, в частности, министерство связи занимало очень взвешенную и 
правильную позицию, что не нужно лезть депутатам в регулирование интернета. Было 
отклонено на уровне министерства связи довольно много законодательных инициатив, 
которые призывали к какому-то подходу к регулированию распространения информации 
в интернете. Все это продолжалось до, условно говоря, 2012 года, когда законодатель, 
разумеется, не самостоятельно, а по указанию из Кремля и при полной поддержке 
Минсвязи, выработал очень действенный механизм, который называется блокировка или 
“черный список интернет-сайтов”. Действительно, поскольку в российском 
технологическом поле есть такая фигура, как Интернет-провайдер, у которого есть 
лицензия на оказание услуг связи, и государство всегда может его этой лицензии лишить 
и, соответственно, обнулить его бизнес, всем российским провайдерам можно сказать: 
“не пускайте пользователей интернета к тем сайтам, которые мы внесем в 
соответствующий реестр”. Соответственно, после этого началась повальная кампания 
по ограничению социальных сетей и интернета, и сейчас компаниям, которые 
вынуждены исполнять российское законодательство, очень трудно конкурировать с 
европейскими, североамериканскими, азиатскими и другими мировыми интернет-
компаниями, потому что введено большое количество малограмотных ограничений на их 
деятельность. Когда я говорю “малограмотный”, это не только моя негативная 
субъективная оценка. Давайте посмотрим на факты: в 2014 году были приняты 
поправки в закон об информации, которые вводили понятие “популярный блогер”. 
Формулировки в законе не то что размытые, а просто не имеют смысла: “владелец 
сайта или страницы в сети интернет (что такое сайт? тем более, что такое 
“страница в сети интернет”? это нигде не определено.) на которых размещается 
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общедоступная информация (то есть, практически любая) и доступ к которым в 
течение суток составляет более трех тысяч пользователей в сети интернет”. Здесь 
просто нарушена грамматическая конструкция - нельзя сказать “доступ составляет 
более трех тысяч пользователей”. Совершенно неясно, что означает та формулировка, 
которую они использовали. С точки зрения юриспруденции, невозможно четко 
установить, что они хотели этим сказать. (Закон был отменен спустя три года.) Раз 
законодатели сами, спустя такое короткое время были вынуждены отменить эти 
поправки, это говорит об их очень низком качестве - законодатель сам признал, что он 
допустил глупость, что он сформулировал те нормы права, которые сам счел 
нецелесообразными. 
После этого были введены серьезные ограничения, связанные с персональными данными: 
все российские интернет-компании обязали хранить данные только в России. Но это не 
всегда возможно, и многим пришлось на это сильно потратиться. Огромных затрат со 
стороны интернет-компаний потребовали действия по предоставлению спец. службам 
знакомиться с перепиской. И последний, пакет Яровой, который потребовал хранить 
абсолютно всю информацию, которая передается всеми пользователями, на жёстких 
дисках. Например, если вы Вконтакте скачаете пять раз фильм “Властелин Колец”, то, 
получается, что “контакту” нужно обзавестись такими жесткими дисками, которые 
позволят хранить пять раз эти гигабайты информации. Больше того, не только 
“вконтакту”, но и провайдеру. Это, конечно, неисполнимо. Это чудовищные объемы 
данных, которые хранить практически невозможно. Очень интересная тактика 
выработана Роскомнадзором. Роскомнадзор ведет переговоры со всеми крупными 
игроками - с Гуглом, с Твиттером, Амазоном - со всеми, кто присутствует на 
российском рынке услуг в сфере интернета, и старается убедить их, иногда мягко, 
иногда жестко, следовать этим правилам. В качестве аргумента, что в случае чего, мы 
готовы вас заблокировать, Роскомнадзор приводит пример социальной сети LinkedIn. 
Она не была очень популярной, разве что среди какого-то узкого круга бизнесменов или 
ориентированных на Запад людей. Но все равно, когда ее в одночасье заблокировали, было 
обозначено, что Кремль готов действовать достаточно жестко в исполнении своих 
угроз, и остальным пришлось как-то с ним договариваться. Понятно, что тот же Гугл 
не выполняет всего, о чем его просит Роскомнадзор, но и старается не занимать 
слишком агрессивную позицию. Крупные компании защищает то, что ими пользуются 
миллионы или десятки миллионов людей, и предполагается, что Кремлю не по силам 
сейчас контролировать тот социальный взрыв, который будет, если он заблокирует 
крупные социальные сети, поэтому они скорее стараются договориться по-хорошему.  
 
Как может сказаться закон о суверенном интернете на российском бизнесе и медиа 
бизнесе в частности? 
 
У закона есть две стадии. На первой стадии он никак не скажется. а во второй фазе он 
может сказаться катастрофически. Первая относится к тому периоду. который сейчас 
идет, когда на бюджетные деньги закупается достаточно дорогостоящее 
оборудование, и это оборудование устанавливается у операторов связи. Скорее всего, 
благодаря этому очень сильно расширятся возможности российских гос. органов что-то 
блокировать, что-то прослушивать, и исподтишка влиять на интернет и его 
контролировать. Но это по большому счету не сильно отличается от ситуации, 
которая есть сейчас, когда уже в принципе российские гос. органы имеют возможность 
и прослушивать, и читать, и блокировать. Но, как я сказал, в этой фазе практически 
ничего не меняется и для пользователей, и для интернета. Вторая фаза возникает 
тогда, когда возникают какие-то чрезвычайные обстоятельства, и я думаю, что Кремль 
в первую очередь беспокоит ситуация, когда массы людей выходят на улицы с какими-то 
протестами (и я бы сказал, что вообще  две трети законодательных инициатив, 
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которые в последние десять лет были предприняты, направлены не на текущую 
ситуацию, а на то, чтобы иметь все рычаги контроля, если начнутся какие-то 
социальные волнения и протесты). В этой ситуации закон «О суверенном Рунете» 
позволит очень быстро выключать любые технологические ресурсы, отдельные сайты, 
отдельные сети, мессенджеры, только технологически, конечно, ситуация будет гораздо 
хуже, чем когда Роскомнадзор блокировал Телеграм и не работали десятки сервисов 
Майкрософта, Амазона, Гугла и многих других интернет компаний. Скорее всего, не 
будет работать ничего, весь интернет будет работать очень непредсказуемым, 
неопределенным образом, в очень некачественном режиме. Но я думаю, что Кремль 
осознанно идет на это, поскольку, во-первых, Кремль вообще очень любит, когда из 
бюджета выделяются средства, которые можно отдать близким кремлю подрядчикам, 
во-вторых, это все-таки, пусть и какое-то иллюзорное, но создание контроля, а в 
ситуации, когда речь будет идти о сохранении власти, то Кремлю будет безразлично, 
что будет с экономикой.  
Таким образом, цифровые медиа хорошо развивались до того, как возникло давление со 
стороны государства, но после 2012  на протяжении последних семи лет с каждым 
годом регулятивная среда становилась все хуже и хуже, и сейчас ее можно оценивать 
как неудовлетворительную, крайне непривлекательную, опасную. 
 
3. В своем интервью 2014 года Вы говорили о наличии верховенства закона и 
справедливого суда в России, за исключением политических дел и дел с явным 
финансовым давлением одной из сторон. Далее Вы добавили, однако, что это - “старые 
добрые времена, когда было примерное равенство сил и разумное законодательство” 
(https://p.dw.com/p/1CVow). Изменилась ли ситуация за последние несколько лет, и какие 
тренды можно наблюдать в судебной практике? 
 
К сожалею, ситуация, должен признать, ухудшилась, и она с каждым годом ухудшалась 
все сильнее и сильнее. Как раз вскоре после 2014 года была изменена структура судов в 
России, был ликвидирован высший Арбитражный суд. Высший Арбитражный суд как раз 
показывал пример того, каким суд должен быть прозрачным, он старался формировать 
предсказуемую практику, достаточно часто выносил решения против гос. органов, 
квалификация судей там была достаточно высокой. Возможно, этой судейской 
самостоятельностью он и заслужил себе такой приговор. Система нижестоящих 
арбитражных судов была сильно изменена. Сейчас во главе и арбитражных судов, и 
судов общей юрисдикции находится Верховный суд, который как раз никогда ни 
особенной открытости, ни независимости, ни даже квалифицированности не 
демонстрировал. Все-таки, наверное, чуть-чуть ухудшилось в этом смысле качество 
судебной системы. Если говорить о судьях, то, конечно, они находятся под двойным 
давлением. Нельзя говорить о том, что судья независим и несменяем. В России, скажем, 
если судья начинает выносить оправдательные приговоры, то это воспринимается как 
нонсенс, и в карьере многих судей вообще нет оправдательных приговоров или их 
количество можно пересчитать по пальцам одной руки. И даже за них судьям 
приходится иногда проходить строгие проверки - “по какой-такой причине он вынес 
целых два оправдательных приговора?”. Но это если говорить об уголовных делах. Если 
брать гражданские дела, то, конечно, всегда сохранится значительная доля дел, в 
которых государству абсолютно все равно - например, если вы - журнал, а я - фотограф, 
и мы с вами судимся, то какая государству в конце концов разница, смогу я с вас 
взыскать триста тысяч рублей или нет за нарушение авторских прав. Конечно, такие 
дела будут разрешаться достаточно независимо. Но ведь у государства все больше и 
больше появляется небезразличных ему бизнесов. То есть, если это будет не маленький 
какой-то журнал, а, скажем, ВГТРК или Первый канал, то не исключено, что судья 
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будет испытывать влияние, что это нужная нам компания. Это то, что касается 
медийных дел, а есть же еще дела, в которых фигурируют миллиарды рублей или 
долларов. государство, а точнее, люди, находящиеся у власти в России, вполне могут 
быть лично заинтересованы в исходе тех или иных дел. Поэтому, с этой стороны 
ситуация тоже ухудшилась: появилось больше игроков на рынке, которые государству 
небезразличны. Сохраняются, иногда, тем не менее, позитивные примеры: например, 10 
дней назад нам удалось впервые взыскать убытки с Роскомнадзора за блокировку сайта в 
арбитражном суде. До этого все такие попытки. например, когда в результате 
блокировок Телеграма десятки и даже сотни сайтов пострадали, были неудачными. В 
этом случае арбитражный суд абсолютно непредвзято взыскал с Роскомнадзора пусть и 
не огромную сумму, всего 15000 рублей, но все же это прекрасный пример, что 
российские суды, особенно арбитражные, еще могут выносить такие единичные 
позитивные решеия. Но если брать статистику, то она, конечно, с каждым годом 
ухудшается, и сейчас нельзя сказать, что юрист, просто грамотно выполняя свою 
работу, может предсказать, каким будет судебное решение. Везде, где участвует 
государство, а таких дел стало больше, суд испытывает влияние, которое стало 
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